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Abstract 
 This paper uses a survey-based approach to test alternative methods of channeling tax 
relief to donors – as a tax rebate for the donor or as a matched payment to the receiving 
charity. On accounting grounds these two are equivalent but, in line with earlier experimental 
studies, we find that gross donations are significantly more responsive to a match change than 
to a rebate change. We show that the difference can largely be explained by the fact that a 
majority of donors do not adjust their nominal donations in response to a change in subsidy. 
This evidence adds to the growing empirical literature suggesting that consumers may not 
react to tax changes. In the case of tax subsidies for donations, this has implications for policy 
design – for the UK a match-based system is likely to be more effective at increasing money 
going to charities.  
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1 Introduction 
The majority of developed countries offer government support to charities in the form of 
tax relief for private donations. Most offer a tax rebate – either deductions from taxable 
income or tax credits granted at the marginal rate of income tax; some countries, 
including the UK, also offer a match element, i.e. charities can claim tax relief on 
donations at an income-tax equivalent rate.  
One of the aims of offering tax relief – whether through a rebate or a match – is to 
encourage donations by lowering the “price” of giving to charity. Empirical evidence on 
the responsiveness of giving to changes in the tax-price is, however, mixed: early studies 
suggested the price elasticity was negative and greater than unity in absolute value (see 
Clotfelter, 1985, Steinberg, 1990, and Triest, 1998), but more recent studies found that, 
after correcting for short-term price effects, tax-price elasticities were significantly 
smaller than this in absolute terms.1  
Recent experimental evidence has cast doubt on the idea that there is a single price 
elasticity, pointing to a possible effect of the form in which tax relief is offered. 
Specifically, lab and field experiments have shown that offering donors a match has a 
bigger effect on the total amount of money going to the charity than offering a rebate of 
equivalent value (Eckel and Grossman, 2003 and 2008). Eckel and Grossman suggest, 
but do not test, one possible explanation that a match may create a warmer glow for 
consumers since it is associated with a co-operative frame (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) 
as opposed to the reward frame of the rebate.   
For policy-makers, this finding is potentially important since it suggests that directing 
tax relief through a match rather than a rebate may be more efficient in terms of 
increasing donations – but this conclusion is tempered by the fact that the experiments 
were not carried out in relation to fiscal incentives, but to incentives offered by 
individual charities. Understanding exactly why donations respond more to a match than 
to a rebate is also important for policy design.  
                                                 
1 Most studies are US based and exploit changes in rebate rates for itemizers. Randolph (1995) uses panel 
data to find a long-run price elasticity of giving of -.51. Using a longer but similar panel to that used by 
Randolph but a different estimation technique, Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002), arrive at the 
significantly higher estimate of -1.26. More recently, Bakija and Heim (2008) find a long-run value of -.7 
–close to Randolph's estimate. Field experiments studying the responses to variations in the match rate 
offered on donations to individual causes have also found that donations respond to whether or not there is 
a match but not the size of the match (Karlan and List, 2007; Huck and Rasul, 2009). 
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The first contribution of this paper is explicitly to test the responsiveness of donations to 
changes in match and rebate incentives offered through the tax system. The UK makes 
an ideal case study because the main scheme through which individuals get tax relief on 
their donations – known as Gift Aid – has both a match and rebate element for higher-
rate taxpayers.2 Looking at the responsiveness of donations in relation to fiscal 
incentives is important since consumers may respond differently to changes in tax 
incentives than to changes in giving incentives for a single charity – the focus of recent 
field experiments (see Karlan and List, 2007, Eckel and Grossman, 2008, Huck and 
Rasul, 2009).  There are many reasons why the response to tax incentives may be 
different, including possible substitution effects associated with single charity 
incentives, since the relative prices of giving to different charities change; consumers 
may also interpret the offer of a match or rebate as a quality signal for a particular 
charity.  
Our results show that, for tax incentives, the match elasticity is significantly greater than 
the rebate elasticity. This finding is in line with the earlier experimental studies. We also 
show that this difference holds for a number of sub-groups, including those who reclaim 
the rebate, those with a higher level of understanding of tax incentives for giving and 
those who give substantial amounts to charity (more than £40,000 a year).  
We do, however, find some differences with the results of the single-charity 
experimental studies. We find that both gross donations (how much the charity gets, 
including the value of tax relief) and nominal donations (how much the donor gives out 
of net-of-tax income) respond to changes in the match rate. This is in contrast to Karlan 
and List (2007) and Huck and Rasul (2009) who find that nominal donations respond to 
the presence of a match but not to the size of the match.  
The second contribution of the paper is to shed light on the underlying reason for why 
donations respond more to the match than to the rebate. We show that the difference can 
be largely attributed to the fact that the majority of donors do not adjust their nominal 
donations (i.e. their donations out of net-of-tax income) in response to either a change in 
the match or a change in the rebate. Total donations received by charities (i.e. gross of 
tax relief) therefore adjust more to a change in the match than they do to a change in the 
                                                 
2 The UK tax system has a basic marginal tax rate of 20% on earnings between £6,475 and £43,875 (2009-
10 rates) and a higher marginal tax rate of 40% on earnings above this. Median earnings in 2009 were 
£20,801.  
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rebate.3 Among those who do adjust their nominal donations, we cannot reject that the 
match and rebate elasticities are the same.  
Our finding that most donors do not adjust their nominal donations in response to a 
change in tax is consistent with other recent evidence that many consumers do not fully 
optimize with respect to tax-inclusive prices (Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009). In 
that literature, individuals respond or do not respond to a tax, rather than a subsidy as in 
our case, and observed choices are made in terms of quantity demanded, rather than 
expenditures as in our case. Nevertheless our findings are broadly in line with those 
studies in that a large proportion of donors appear not to process the change in subsidy 
even when all the relevant information is available to them. 
For policy-makers the finding that gross donations are more responsive to a match than 
to a rebate suggests that, for a given total amount of public funding available to support 
private donations, shifting tax relief away from a rebate system and towards a match 
system would result in a higher volume of total donations going to charity – at least in 
the short run. We conclude the paper by showing for the UK that it would be possible to 
introduce a cost-neutral change in the system of tax relief that increases the total amount 
of funding for charities.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant features of 
the UK system of tax relief on donations. Section 3 presents our survey design and 
section 4 presents the main findings. Section 5 explores heterogeneity of responses 
across donors. Section 6 discusses the implications of our results for policy.  
 
2 Gift Aid in the UK 
Unlike the US, where tax subsidies for donations are in the form of a deduction, the 
main scheme for providing tax relief on donations in the UK offers a match subsidy on 
donations made by all taxpayers through the scheme, combined with an additional rebate 
subsidy for higher rate taxpayers.  
The scheme, known as Gift Aid, works in the following way: individuals donate to 
charity out of their net-of-tax income.4 The charity can reclaim tax relief on donations 
                                                 
3 If nominal donations are unchanged then the elasticity of gross donations will be -1 in the case of the 
match and zero in the case of the rebate.  
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made by taxpayers at the basic rate of tax, currently 20 per cent,5 which means that for 
every £1 donated to charity, the charity can reclaim 25 pence.6 This can be thought of as 
a match on donations made by taxpayers. In addition, higher-rate taxpayers can reclaim 
a rebate equal to the difference between the higher rate of tax at 40 per cent and the 
basic rate of tax at 20 per cent on the “gross” equivalent donation, i.e. the amount before 
basic rate tax was deducted. This means that for every £1 donated out of net income, a 
higher-rate taxpayer can get an additional rebate of 25 pence.  
This two-part system is slightly more complicated than the US system of deductions but 
is designed for a tax system where the majority of taxpayers do not file tax returns. Note 
that in order for higher-rate taxpayers to receive the additional higher rate rebate, they 
need to make a claim through a self-assessment tax return (completed by approximately 
a third of all UK taxpayers) or ask for a change in their tax code via a simpler tax review 
form. Either way, there is an additional administrative cost for donors on the rebate 
element compared to the match element.  
 
Table 1: Tax relief on charitable donations in the UK 
 Gross donations Cost of tax relief 
Gift Aid £4,305 million £1,217 million(1) 
Payroll Giving £104 million £30 million(2) 
Tax relief on shares or property £266 million(3) £70 million(3) 
Legacies £1,932 million £290 million(3) 
Notes to table:  
(1) The cost of Gift Aid tax relief comprises Gift Aid repayments to charities, including transitional relief 
payments, and the estimated cost of higher-rate relief.  
(2) Estimated  
(3) The most recent statistics are for 2007-08  
Source: HM Revenue and Customs 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
4 When it was originally established, tax relief was only given for donations exceeding a minimum 
threshold. This threshold was initially set at £600, reduced to £400 from May 1992 and to £250 from 
March 1993 and abolished altogether in 2000. 
5 Note that individuals must have paid the amount of tax that the charity is going to reclaim, i.e. the relief 
is a non-refundable tax credit.  
6 In addition, charities can reclaim an additional 3 pence of transitional relief for every £1 given on 
donations made before April 6, 2011 if a claim is made within two years of the end of the tax year in 
which the donation is made. This is compensation for an earlier cut in the basic rate of income tax. 
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Gift Aid is not the only scheme offering tax incentives for UK donors. There is also a 
payroll-giving scheme that allows donors to give to charity out of their gross earnings; 
gifts of shares and property also attract tax relief and charitable bequests are exempt 
from inheritance tax. However, as shown in Table 1, Gift Aid accounts for the majority 
of tax-free donations – more than £4 billion in 2008-09 out of estimated total donations 
of around £10 billion.7 Given the presence of both a match and a rebate element for 
higher-rate taxpayers, Gift Aid provides the ideal opportunity to test the effect of match 
and rebate subsidies in a fiscal policy setting.  
 
The effect of offering tax relief through Gift Aid is to lower the “price” of giving to 
charity. The price of giving £1 of funding to the charity is equal to (1 – r ) /(1 + m) 
where r is the rebate rate and m is the match rate. In the UK, the effective match and 
rebate rates are .25, but only higher-rate taxpayers are eligible for the rebate. Both basic-
rate taxpayers and higher-rate taxpayers get relief at their marginal tax rates – for higher-
rate taxpayers, the price of giving £1 of funding to a charity through Gift Aid is 
therefore £.60, while for basic-rate taxpayers it is £.80.  
Assuming that consumers care about how much money charities receive,8 this reduction 
in price brought about by the tax relief would be expected to result in an increase in total 
funding going to charities (i.e. gross donations) but not necessarily an increase in 
individuals’ net donations. Donors may take advantage of the fact that the government 
has increased the value of the subsidy to charity to reduce the value of their cash 
donation, an effect referred to as “crowd out” (see Andreoni, 2006, for a discussion).9 If 
the price elasticity of gross donations is less than unity in absolute value – as suggested 
by recent estimates (e.g. Randolph, 1995, and Bajika and Heim, 2008) – then the effect 
                                                 
7 The figure for total donations is an estimate. However, it suggests that a large proportion of all donations 
do not attract tax relief. This includes many donations made into collecting tins, as well as donations made 
by non-taxpayers.  
8 People may also wish to give to charity to signal their wealth and/or generosity. In this case gross 
donations would be expected to respond more to changes in the rebate – which change the price of the 
signal – than to changes in the match – which do not. Since this is inconsistent with the empirical findings, 
here we do not consider this possible motivation for giving.  
9 If donors care only about how much the charity receives and not their own contribution (i.e. they are 
pure altruists), then there is likely to be 100% crowd out; if donors also care about their own contribution 
to the charity (i.e. if they are warm glow givers) then it will be less than this.  
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of tax relief will be to increase gross donations received by charity, but individuals’ net 
donations will fall.  
However, the experimental findings of Eckel and Grossman (2003) suggest that there 
may not be a single price elasticity, with gross donations responding differently to 
changes in the match than to changes in the rebate. In light of those results, it is 
important to account not only for how tax relief affects the price of giving, but also for 
the actual form tax relief takes.   
 
3  Sample and survey design 
Eckel and Grossman (2003) tested responses to match and rebate in a laboratory 
experiment that involved 181 undergraduate students each given twelve allocation 
problems varying in the initial endowment and match and rebate rates. In the 
experiment, match rates resulted in gross donations that were 1.2 to 2 times greater than 
the equivalent-value rebate. The estimated match elasticity was -1.14 compared a rebate 
elasticity of -.36. Similar results were obtained from a field experiment (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2008). Based on approximately 7,000 responses to a mail-out on behalf of 
Minnesota Public Radio, offering match rates resulted in a higher level of gross 
donations than equivalent-value rebates. The estimated elasticity of gross donations was 
-1.05 in the case of the match rate and -.11 in the case of the rebate rate.  
The aim of this study is explicitly to test whether the match and rebate elasticities differ 
with respect to tax-price changes. The overall design of our study was broadly consistent 
with the field experiment described above.10 Survey respondents were randomly 
allocated across “treatments” offering different levels of match and/or rebate subsidy in 
order to test how donations respond. However, for practical reasons, the treatments in 
our study were purely hypothetical; we do not have any information on how donors 
actually respond, instead individuals were asked to say how they would respond to 
hypothetical policy scenarios.  
There is an obvious potential concern that our results may be affected by hypothetical or 
strategic bias (see Harrison and Rutström, 2009). We attempted to reduce this problem 
from the start by informing the respondents that the survey was carried out on behalf of 
the UK Treasury and emphasizing the need to answer questions carefully and honestly 
                                                 
10 See also Karlan and List (2007) and Huck and Rasul (2009). 
 7 
to “ensure that any changes in the tax treatment of donations are designed to help both 
donors and charities.”11 We also asked respondents to consider how the alternative tax 
treatments would affect a specific donation that they were likely to make in the next six 
months in order to make it more concrete.  
Finally, the survey itself contains a number of consistency checks. In particular we can 
exploit the fact that each individual was asked to respond to two scenarios to check for 
consistency. For example, we deliberately included the same treatment twice but in a 
different order to test for so-called “embedding effects” (the phenomenon that the 
responses depend on the way, and the order, in which questions are presented, see 
Diamond and Hausman, 1994). As shown below, we find no evidence that such 
embedding effects were important in practice.  
 
3.1  The sample 
Invitations to take part in an on-line survey were e-mailed to 40,000 donors, split equally 
between people with a Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) Charity Account and people 
who had donated online through Justgiving during the previous six months.   
CAF is a charity that, among a range of services for individuals and charities, provides a 
charity account to donors to facilitate tax-efficient giving. Individuals pay into an 
account and use the funds to make donations to any registered charity (currently more 
than 80,000) through a variety of different means (direct debit, online, by phone or using 
a CAF card or cheque book). For the survey, the relevant population consisted of 32,339 
CAF account-holders with an e-mail address. E-mail invites were sent to a randomly 
selected sample of 20,000 individuals within this population.   
Justgiving is an online giving portal that processes donations from individuals direct to 
charity and individual sponsorships of charity fundraisers. Justgiving reclaims tax relief 
at the basic rate of tax (assuming the donor is a taxpayer) and passes on the donations 
and the tax relief to member charities. Since it started in 1994, it has processed 
donations for more than 8,000 charities. For the survey, a random sample of 20,000 
donors were sent an e-mail invite out of a total population of 2.56 million who had 
donated via Justgiving in the past six months.  
                                                 
11 This was motivated by earlier findings that a so-called “cheap talk script” could reduce some of the 
problems associated with hypothetical surveys – see Cummings and Taylor (1999). 
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The response rates were 9.86% among the CAF sample and 9.19% among the Justgiving 
sample. After some data cleaning, our analysis sample comprises 3,146 donors – 1,442 
higher-rate taxpayers and 1,704 basic-rate taxpayers.12 Descriptive statistics on this 
sample are summarised in Appendix 1. Due to both sampling and response bias, our 
responses are unlikely to be fully representative of the UK population of Gift Aid 
donors. In Appendix 1 we also present some evidence that we over-sample larger 
donors; respondents may also be better informed about in tax incentives than the average 
Gift Aid donor. Section 5 analyses responses among various sub-groups, which gives an 
indication of how this is likely to affect our results.  
 
3.2  Survey design 
Respondents who were higher-rate taxpayers were randomly allocated to one of five 
“treatments” each of which contained two hypothetical scenarios reflecting different 
combinations of match and rebate. Basic rate taxpayers were randomly allocated to one 
of two “treatments”, also each with two scenarios. All the scenarios are summarized in 
Table 2. The design and description of the scenarios in the survey reflect the way Gift 
Aid is currently portrayed to donors – i.e. the charity receives X pence for every £1 
given out of net-of-tax income and the individual can reclaim X pence for every £1 
given out of net-of-tax income.  
For each scenario, respondents were asked how the change in tax treatment would affect 
their giving in relation to a specific “initial donation”, an amount they reported that they 
were likely to give in the next six months. 13 Figure A1 (Appendix 2) shows how the 
hypothetical scenarios appeared in the on-line survey. Note that the specific terms, 
“match” and “rebate” were not used in the survey because they are not used to describe 
the scheme in practice. Respondents were first asked whether the change in tax 
treatment would mean they would give the same, give more or give less. A follow-up 
question then asked how much they would give if they reported that their donation 
would change. 
                                                 
12 A small-scale pilot was used to test the questionnaire and observe response rates. In the pilot, 
individuals were randomly offered a small financial inducement to take part but this had no significant 
effect on response rates and was not offered in the main survey. 
13 Only 10% of respondents said that they were unlikely to give in the next six months. Where this was the 
case, they were asked about a specific donation they had made within the past six months. Whether 
individuals were asked about a future or past donation made no significant difference to the responses.   
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  Table 2: Alternative tax treatments 
  
Match/rebate per 
£1 nominal 
donation 
 
Price 
  
Match/rebate per 
£1 nominal 
donation 
 
Price 
 
Mean GA 
donations  
 
N 
(a) Higher rate taxpayers – changes in either match or rebate (current system: m = .25, r = .25) 
A1 m = .30, r = .25 .577 A2 m = .25, r = .30 .560 £2,211 290 
B1 m = .20, r = .25 .625 B2 m = .25, r = .20 .640 £2,818 293 
(b) Higher rate taxpayers – changes in both match and rebate (current system: m = .25,  r = .25) 
C1 m = .50, r = 0 .667 C2 m = .30, r = 0 .769 £2,043 289 
D1 m = .30, r = 0 .769 D2 m = .37, r = 0 .730 £1,905 288 
E1 m = .66, r = 0 .600 E2 m = .50, r = 0 .667 £2,934 282 
(c) Basic rate taxpayers – changes in match (current system: m = .25, r = 0) 
F1 m = .30, r = 0 .769 F2 m = .37, r = 0 .730 £821 856 
G1 m = .37, r = 0 .730 G2 m = .30, r = 0 .769 £859 848 
 
 
For each scenario, respondents were asked how the change in tax treatment would affect 
their giving in relation to a specific “initial donation”, an amount they reported that they 
were likely to give in the next six months. 14 Figure A1 (Appendix 2) shows how the 
hypothetical scenarios appeared in the on-line survey. Note that the specific terms, 
“match” and “rebate” were not used in the survey because they are not used to describe 
the scheme in practice. Respondents were first asked whether the change in tax 
treatment would mean they would give the same, give more or give less. A follow-up 
question then asked how much they would give if they reported that their donation 
would change. 
For higher-rate taxpayers, two treatments – set A and set B in panel (a) – tested 
responses to changes in either the match or the rebate (but not both). Note that the 
changes in match and rebate were symmetrical in terms of pence change for each £1 
                                                 
14 Only 10% of respondents said that they were unlikely to give in the next six months. Where this was the 
case, they were asked about a specific donation they had made within the past six months. Whether 
individuals were asked about a future or past donation made no significant difference to the responses.   
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donated but, as shown in column (III), not price changes.15 This is in contrast to Eckel 
and Grossman (2003, 2008) who defined match and rebate pairs that were equivalent in 
value but had different rates – for example, a 25% match and a 20% rebate. However, 
experimental evidence shows that individuals respond differently to alternatives that 
produce exactly the same outcome but that are presented to them through different 
“frames of reference” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In this case, there is a potential 
concern that donors may respond more to what they perceive is a “larger” match.  
In our survey, the changes in the match and rebate are expressed in terms of equal pence 
changes but are not equivalent in terms of price. For example, in Set A, individuals are 
faced with two scenarios: 
1) A match of 30 pence and a rebate of 25 pence (price of giving = .577); 
2) A match of 25 pence and a rebate of 30 pence (price of giving = .560). 
If the match and rebate elasticities are the same, there should be a larger percentage 
change in gross donations under (2) because the price change is greater. If the donor 
perceives the changes under (1) and (2) to be equivalent, gross donations should respond 
in the same way under both. If we find that gross donations respond less to (2), this is a 
strong indication that donations are less responsive to changes in the rebate than to 
changes in the match.  
The other treatments for higher-rate taxpayers – sets C, D and E in panel (b) – were 
designed to explore responses to specific, possible policy options. They involved 
scenarios that eliminated the rebate altogether and made the match subsidy more 
generous. In set E, scenario 1 the match is 66 pence, changing the form of the tax 
subsidy but not the price. The other scenarios in sets C, D and E, while increasing the 
generosity of the match subsidy, involve increases in the price of giving compared to the 
current system. The same scenarios were included twice (C1 & E2 and C2 & D1) to test 
for embedding effects. 
The current system only offers basic rate taxpayers a match and the scenarios, shown in 
panel (c), tested changes in the match rate. Basic rate taxpayers were randomly assigned 
to two treatments that offered the same scenarios, but in a different order.  
                                                 
15 The choice to make the changes symmetrical in terms of pence was to make it easier for respondents to 
understand the proposed changes since they reflected the way Gift Aid is typically presented.  
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Table 2 also summarizes the number of people faced with each scenario and the average 
amount donated by these individuals through Gift Aid over the previous 12 months. 
While there is some variation in donations across scenarios, none of the differences is 
statistically significant, indicating that the random allocation was effective. 
 
4 Estimating responses to match and rebate  
We estimate the following random effects model16 separately for basic rate and higher-
rate taxpayers to obtain the percentage change in donations associated with each of the 
scenarios:  
ln gis = αi + βs + uis ,       (1) 
where gis is the gross donation of individual i under scenario s – defined as the nominal 
donation the individual makes out of net-of-tax income grossed-up by the value of the 
match if present (i.e. the total donation received by the charity);17 αi is a fixed individual 
specific term that captures the effects of observed and unobserved characteristics on 
donations; βs captures the response to each of the counterfactual scenarios (with β0 = 0); 
uis is a zero-mean, random error term associated with each level of donation for each 
individual that can be thought of as capturing rounding or reporting error for each 
scenario. 
In the first instance, we include indicators for all ten scenarios for higher-rate taxpayers 
and four scenarios for basic-rate taxpayers to test for embedding effects. Tests for 
significant differences across the scenarios, reported in Appendix A2, showed there 
were significant differences in gross donations across distinct scenario pairs and not 
across same scenario pairs. This acts a check on the reliability of our results, and is 
consistent with there being no embedding effects.  
Of course, some of the variation in gross donations comes from the match rate itself. 
However, looking at the results from running the same regressions on nominal donations 
(Appendix A2), there were many instances of significant differences across distinct 
                                                 
16 This is efficient and unbiased if the rebate and match terms are unrelated to individuals’ characteristics. 
Since the rebate and match terms are randomly allocated to individuals this should be true by assumption. 
Very similar results were obtained from a fixed effects model.  
17 We focus on gross donations since this represents the individual’s total “giving” resulting from her  
contribution. It also allows us to compare our estimates with those from previous studies. 
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scenario pairs. This is in contrast to the findings from recent field experiments run by 
Karlan and List (2007) and Huck and Rasul (2009), which found that nominal donations 
were insensitive to changes in the match rate (although not to the presence of a match 
rate).    
With no significant difference in gross donations across same-scenario pairs, we choose 
to focus the rest of the analysis on the smaller set of distinct scenarios. Table 3 
summarises the results for the scenarios that change either the match or rebate, which 
are comparable with previous studies. Among higher-rate taxpayers, the results show a 
significantly larger change in gross donations for a change in the match than for the 
same pence change in the rebate.  
Table 3 also shows the implied elasticity of gross donations for each scenario (column 
(3)) – based on the estimated percentage change in donations and the associated 
percentage price change.18 The difference in elasticities between the match and rebate 
changes is even greater than the difference in percentage changes in gross donations 
because the change in the rebate is associated with a smaller percentage change in price. 
Looking at column (3), panel (a), the match elasticity for higher-rate taxpayers is -1.417 
for an increase in the match and -0.847 for a decrease in the match. For changes in the 
rebate, the estimates are -0.498 and 0.093 respectively.  For basic-rate taxpayers, the 
implied match elasticities are -1.290 and -1.258. 
In line with the earlier experimental studies, we therefore find that the match elasticity is 
greater than the rebate elasticity.  In the previous studies, the estimated match elasticities 
were in the range -1.14 to -1.05 and the rebate elasticities were in the range -.36 to -.11. 
Of course, our estimates may not be directly comparable because of differences in 
sample composition across the studies.19 As we show in the next section, there is some 
variation in elasticities across the population, according to characteristics such size of 
donation.   
 
                                                 
18 We use a base price of 0.6 although, as we show later, many higher-rate taxpayers do not reclaim the 
rebate and so face and effective price of 0.8. 
19 There is no information on the sample composition in Eckel and Grossman’s (2008) field experiment 
which would allow us to make a direct comparison. One further possible source of difference is that our 
results correspond only to adjustment on the intensive margin since we sample people who give through 
Gift Aid.  
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                  Table 3: Main results   
  Regression results: 
Dependent variable = ln (gross 
donation) 
 
 
Scenario 
Tax treatment 
m = match 
r = rebate 
(1) 
Coeff. 
(2) 
SE 
(3) 
Implied 
elasticity 
Higher rate taxpayers – changes in either match or rebate (current system: m = .25, r = 25) 
A1 m = .30, r = .25 .0543 (.0046) -1.417 
A2 m = .25, r = .30 .0332 (.0046) -.498 
B1 m = .20, r = .25 -.0353 (.0046) -.847 
B2 m = .25, r = .20 .0062 (.0046) .093 
Basic rate taxpayers – changes in match (current system: m = .25, r = 0) 
F1, G2 m = .30, r = 0 .0496 (.0014) -1.290 
F2, G1 m = .37, r = 0 .1102 (.0014) -1.258 
 
5 Heterogeneity of responses 
In this section we explore the responsiveness of donations to changes in the match and 
rebate among a number of sub-groups. The aim is both to illustrate differences across 
groups and to explore possible explanations for the observed difference in match and 
rebate elasticity.  
Table 4 reports estimates of elasticities for different sub-groups. We focus on higher-rate 
taxpayers and on responses to changes in either the match or the rebate (i.e. the set of 
four scenarios in panel (a) in Table 2). Because of the smaller number of observations in 
each group we pool across the four scenarios and run regressions of the form:20 
ln gis = αi + βr ln (1 − rs) − βm ln (1 + ms) + uis ,    (2) 
where βm and βr capture the elasticity of gross donations with respect to the match and 
rebate, respectively.  
                                                 
20 This assumes that gross donations depend on the price in the following way gi = θi q βr ,  where  
q = (1 − r) / (1 + m)βm /βr, and βm/βr is the relative weight given to the match compared to the rebate in 
the price of giving. 
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5.1 Reclaimers and non-reclaimers 
One possible explanation for why donations are more responsive to the match than to the 
rebate may be because of the additional cost for the donor associated with reclaiming the 
rebate, involving filling in a tax form. In practice, many higher-rate taxpayers do not get 
the rebate and their donations are therefore only likely to respond to changes in the 
match rate and not to changes in the rebate (although changes in the rebate may affect 
the probability of reclaiming). We explore this by comparing responses among 
reclaimers and non-reclaimers.21      
In our sample, 44% of higher-rate taxpayers were non-reclaimers. As might be expected 
if the decision to reclaim were based on costs and benefits,22 the probability of 
reclaiming is closely linked to the amount donated – from fewer than 20% of those who 
give a few pounds a year through Gift Aid to around 75% of those who give more than 
£2,000 a year (Figure 123).  
However, the presence of many non-reclaimers cannot fully account for the higher 
match elasticity. As shown in Table 4 the estimated rebate elasticity among reclaimers is      
higher than among non-reclaimers, as would be expected (-.415 compared to .032).24 
However, among reclaimers, the estimated match elasticity is -1.277 and is significantly 
higher than the rebate elasticity. 
 
 
                                                 
21 We did not directly ask whether changes in the rebate affected the decision to reclaim; we therefore split 
the sample by whether people currently reclaim or not.  
22 More than half of non-reclaimers said they were not aware they could. But nearly one third of non-
reclaimers cited the time and effort it would take, while a further 19% said that it was too complicated. 
One-quarter said that they did not reclaim because they would only get a small amount of money back. 
(Respondents could tick more than one answer.) 
23 Those who give more than £10,000 are not shown in this Figure; 97% of this group said that they 
reclaimed.  
24 Of the various price elasticities estimated in this paper, the rebate elasticity for reclaimers is the most 
directly comparable to the estimated price elasticities from US studies which consider responses to 
changes in the rebate for itemizers, although we consider only the intensive margin. The estimate of -.415 
is consistent with the recent studies that suggest that the elasticity is less than one in absolute value.  
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Figure 1: Proportion of donors who reclaim, by size of donations 
 
Note: Shows the proportion of reclaimers, according to total donations, together with a smoothed, non-
parametric estimator of the relationship between donation size and probability of reclaiming. 
 
 
        Table 4: Estimated elasticities for sub-groups  
 Estimated match elasticity Estimated rebate elasticity P-value  
All higher-rate 
taxpayers 
-1.127  (.067) -.212  (.041) .0000 
Whether or not individual reclaims higher-rate rebate 
Reclaimers -1.277  (.096) -.415  (.091) .0000 
Non-reclaimers -.946  (.091) .032  (.054) .0000 
Level of understanding (higher-rate reclaimers) 
“Good” -1.368  (.116) -.440  (.070) .0000 
“Poor” -1.095  (.170) -.366  (.102) .0000 
Size of donations (higher-rate reclaimers) 
Quartile 1: £334 -1.177  (.220) -.473  (.132) .0002 
Quartile 2: £1,056 -1.220  (.170) -.277  (.119) .0000 
Quartile 3: £2,951 -1.154  (.180) -.366  (.110) .0000 
Quartile 4: £20,193 -1.496  (.202) -.559  (.123) .0000 
Top decile: £39,127 -1.207  (.334) -.486  (.199) .0170 
Whether or not donor adjusts nominal donations (higher rate reclaimers) 
Adjusters -1.929 (.297) -1.431 (.179) .0581 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses, p-value is for the test that the match and rebate elasticity are equal  
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5.2 Level of understanding 
Another factor that is likely to affect how people respond to the hypothetical scenario is 
whether or not they understand the implications of the proposed change in tax treatment 
for the price of giving. The effect of the proposed tax change on price is not explained in 
the description of the scenario (see Figure A2) – deliberately so since donors should 
ideally respond to the scenario as they would to a change in the tax treatment, based on 
their perception of how the tax change might affect the price of giving and their current 
level of understanding.  
However, it is possible that at least some people do not fully understand the effect of the 
proposed tax changes on the price of giving; they might also find it easier to understand 
the implications of one of the two types of relief (match or rebate). In practice, therefore, 
the response might vary according to whether people understand the implications of the 
proposed tax change or not.  
To explore this, we analyse the responses separately for donors according to their likely 
level of understanding of tax incentives. This is assessed on the basis of their response to 
a question about how much the match is worth to charities. Respondents are told that the 
charity can reclaim basic-rate tax and asked to say how much the charity gets for each 
£1 donated out of net-of-tax income (choosing one out of a set of possible responses). If 
they respond correctly, we define them as having a good level of understanding. If they 
do not choose the correct answer, we define them as having a poor level of 
understanding. We find some difference between those with “good” and “poor” 
understanding” – those with a good understanding are more responsive to changes in 
both match and rebate. Nevertheless, we find that the match elasticity is significantly 
higher than the rebate elasticity for both groups.  
 
5.3  Size of donations 
Table 4 also shows elasticity estimates by size of total donations, focusing on higher-rate 
reclaimers. There is some evidence that donations from larger donors are more sensitive 
to changes in the rebate than donations from smaller donors. Given that we over-sample 
large donors, our results are therefore likely to be an under-estimate of the difference in 
match and rebate elasticity among the population. Even in the top decile, however, 
which includes donors who give £40,000 a year or more, the match elasticity is 
significantly greater than the rebate elasticity.   
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5.4  Adjusters/non-adjusters  
A unique feature of our survey approach, compared to existing field experiments, is that 
it has a pseudo-panel element allowing us to see exactly how individuals respond to the 
proposed tax changes. In practice, we find that a large number of people do not respond 
to the proposed tax change by adjusting their nominal donations (i.e. out of net-of-tax 
income). The high levels of non-adjustment – the majority of donors for each scenario – 
are shown in Table 5, which summarises the proportion who adjust their donations, 
separating higher-rate reclaimers and non-reclaimers.  
The very high level of non-adjustment is a striking finding from our survey. A potential 
concern is that it may be an artefact of the hypothetical nature of the survey; there is no 
benefit to respondents if they respond truthfully and calculating the optimal level of 
donation associated with the new tax price may have a small computational cost. It may 
simply be easier for donors to say that they would not adjust their nominal donations. 
However, counter to this, Table 5 shows that the proportion adjusting varies 
 
        Table 5: Estimated elasticities for sub-groups  
 
Match/rebate per £1 
nominal donation 
 
Proportion adjusting 
 
Match/rebate per £1 
nominal donation 
 
Proportion adjusting 
Higher-rate reclaimers  
m = .30, r = .25 .149 m = .66, r = 0 .239 
m = .25, r = .30 .377 m = .50, r = 0 .225 
m = .20, r = .25 .086 m = .37, r = 0 .266 
m = .25, r = .20 .126 m = .30, r = 0 .222 
Higher-rate non-reclaimers 
m = .30, r = .25 .060 m = .66, r = 0 .129 
m = .25, r = .30 .090 m = .50, r = 0 .146 
m = .20, r = .25 .024 m = .37, r = 0 .125 
m = .25, r = .20 .012 m = .30, r = 0 .067 
Basic-rate  
m = .30, r = 0 .068 m = .37, r = 0 .101 
 
 
 18 
significantly across the scenarios – among higher-rate reclaimers, the proportion 
adjusting to changes in the rebate is typically greater than the proportion adjusting to 
changes in the match while among higher-rate reclaimers typically more people adjust to 
a larger change in the match rate. In many cases, these differences across scenarios arise 
because the same individual reports that they will adjust in the case of one of the 
scenarios and not the other. Also, as already noted, our finding on the match and rebate 
elasticities is in line with those from previous experimental studies, again suggesting 
that the responses are plausible.  
Non-adjustment can potentially explain the difference between the observed match and 
rebate elasticities because of the way in which the match and rebate differentially impact 
on gross donations among non-adjusters – the elasticities of gross donations with respect 
to match and rebate among non-adjusters are -1 and zero respectively.  Assuming that 
there is a single underlying elasticity, ε, with respect to changes in the match or rebate, 
but that, for whatever reason, only a proportion of donors πm ( πr ) adjust to the match 
(rebate) then the observed match ( ) and rebate ( ) elasticities are given by: 
,        (3) 
         (4) 
The observed match elasticity will be greater than the observed rebate elasticity if  
 
         
(5) 
If the probabilities of adjusting to the match and rebate are the same (and less than one), 
the observed match elasticity will always be greater than the observed rebate elasticity. 
In practice, we find that more people adjust to a change in the rebate than to a change in 
the match (see Table 5). However, based on the observed proportions adjusting (and 
focusing on responses to an increase in match/rebate), the observed match elasticity for 
higher-rate reclaimers would still be greater than the observed rebate elasticity so long 
as the elasticity among adjusters is less than 3.70. 
Table 4 shows estimates of match and rebate elasticities separately for adjusters (i.e. 
donors who adjust to at least one of the two scenarios). Within this group, gross 
donations are much more responsive to changes in the rebate compared to the rest of the 
sample. While the match elasticity is still higher, the difference is no longer statistically 
significant. This finding indicates that the underlying elasticities may be much more 
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similar, and that much of the explanation for the large observed difference between 
match and rebate elasticities both here and in the earlier experimental studies lies in the 
fact that many donors do not adjust their nominal donations in response to a tax change, 
and the differential implications of changes in the match and rebate for gross donations 
among non-adjusters. 
What then explains why so many donors do not adjust their nominal donations in line 
with tax changes? Table 6 gives some insights, summarising donors’ responses when 
they were asked why they were not going to change their donations. The most 
commonly given reason is that donors decide on their level of nominal donations before 
taking account of the tax relief. Within the literature on why people give to charity, there 
are a number of possible explanations for why individuals may care about their level of 
nominal donations (rather than the amount of money going to the charity), including a 
desire to signal either their wealth or generosity.25 However, in these cases, the level of 
donations would be expected to respond more to a change in the rebate, which would 
change the price of the signal, than to a change in the match, which is not consistent 
with the empirical findings.26 Instead, in line with other studies on consumer behaviour 
 
           Table 6: Main reason for not adjusting nominal donations  
 Non-reclaimers Reclaimers 
I make my decision about how much to give before 
considering the tax relief 
55.8% 49.2% 
The tax relief has no effect on my decision about 
how much to give 
20.1% 19.2% 
I have a regular commitment to giving money that 
I don’t want to change 
11.2% 20.0% 
I prefer to give a rounded amount and not make 
small adjustments 
5.5% 5.7% 
The change in tax is so small, it is not worth 
bothering about 
4.6% 3.6% 
Other/ don’t know 2.9% 2.5% 
Number of observations 583 647 
                                                 
25 See Andreoni (2006) for a discussion of the literature that addresses motives for giving. 
26 This was also supported by other choice experiment questions in the survey that revealed that more 
people would prefer tax relief in the form of a match to a rebate.   
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in response to taxes (Chetty et al., 2009, Finkelstein, 2009), we interpret these responses 
as an indication that tax incentives are not “salient” for individuals’ decisions about how 
much to give. The other responses indicate that there may be costs associated with 
processing the change in instrument and adjusting the level of donation.27   
	  
6 Implications for policy design 
The role of private provision alongside public provision of collective goods has been the 
source of much debate in the economics literature and in the policy debate, and 
continues to be so.28 Even abstracting from this broader question, there is still the 
narrower question of why government would want to support private charities by 
offering tax incentives to private donors rather by direct government grants to charities. 
How responsive donations are to changes in the price of giving is crucial in this respect. 
A value of the price elasticity of giving equal to unity in absolute value implies that net 
donations are insensitive to tax incentives, and that gross funding for charities increases 
simply by the amount of the tax relief – as it would if government support was delivered 
through a direct grant. Thus, only if the elasticity is greater than unity in absolute value, 
there is a prima facie argument for tax incentives. Nevertheless, a well-known argument 
due to Roberts (1987) shows that even if net donations do not increase when tax relief is 
provided, delivering government support via tax relief can still dominate direct 
government grants to charities if the latter would have the effect of crowding out private 
donations – an effect for which there is convincing evidence (Andreoni and Payne, 
2001). 
Taking the objective of promoting private provision and the choice of doing so through 
incentives as given, the observed difference between the match and rebate elasticities – 
with the former being greater than the latter – suggests that it would be more efficient to 
offer tax subsidies in the form of a match rather than a rebate, in terms of securing more 
money for charities.  
                                                 
27 In a companion paper we show that these findings can be rationalised by a model of rational inattention. 
28 Examples are Feldstein and Clotfelter (1977), Warr (1982), Scharf (2000). 
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To explore this conjecture further, our hypothetical scenarios included a number of 
options that removed the rebate altogether and instead channelled all tax relief to 
charities as a higher match rate (Table 2, panel (c)). Table 6 shows the estimated average 
change in gross donations – and implied elasticities – associated with each of these 
options, focusing on higher-rate taxpayers. We run separate regressions for reclaimers 
and non-reclaimers.   
The average effect on gross donations is positive in all cases, although insignificant in 
the case of offering a 30 pence match to reclaimers. In Scenario E1, the price of giving 
is unchanged compared to the current system; the other scenarios involve a reduction in 
the price of giving and the implied price elasticities shown in column 3 therefore have 
the “wrong” sign when compared to the current price of £0.60 that incorporates the 
effect of both match and rebate element. In fact, for non-reclaimers, the changes make 
the system of tax relief more generous; the implied elasticities when the initial price is 
taken to be £0.80 (i.e. including just the match) are shown in column 4.  
   
   Table 6: Estimated elasticities for alternative policy options 
  Regression results: 
Dependent variable  
= ln (gross donation) 
 
Implied elasticity 
 
Scenario 
Tax treatment 
m = match 
r = rebate 
(1) 
Coeff. 
(2) 
SE 
(3) 
Initial price = 
£0.60 
(4) 
Initial price 
= £0.80 
Reclaimers 
E1 m = .66, r = 0 .2664 (.0059) - - 
C1, E2 m = .50, r = 0 .1616 (.0044) 1.447 - 
D2 m = .37, r = 0 .0602 (.0062) .278 - 
C2, D1 m = .30, r = 0 .0024 (.0045) .008 - 
Non-reclaimers 
E1 m = .66, r = 0 .3158 (.0065) - -1.263 
C1, E2 m = .50, r = 0 .2112 (.0046) 1.891 -1.270 
D2 m = .37, r = 0 .1119 (.0060) .516 -1.278 
C2, D1 m = .30, r = 0 .0454 (.0045) .161 -1.171 
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These regression results give an indication of the average change in gross donations for 
reclaimers and non-reclaimers. The overall effect on gross donations, however, needs to 
take into account the relative proportions of these two groups in the population of Gift 
Aid donors; and also the fact that bigger donors are typically more responsive than 
smaller. We therefore estimate the likely overall effect on gross donations, as the 
following: 
      
(6) 
where w is a weight given to each high-rate taxpayer group (N, non-reclaimers, and R, 
reclaimers) to re-weight the sample proportions to those in the population29; G0 is initial 
gross donations. We do the same for the likely effect on the cost of tax relief to the 
government.30 
The results are shown in Figure 2. We show both the estimated percentage change in 
gross donations and the estimated percentage change in the cost of tax relief for each of 
the four distinct match rates in the scenarios – £0.30, £0.37, £0.50 and £0.66 – together 
with smoothed, linear predictions. The central estimates, shown by the bold lines, 
assume that 35% of higher-rate taxpayers reclaim; we also carry out sensitivity analysis, 
varying the proportion of higher-rate taxpayers who reclaim in the population by ten 
percentage points above and below the central assumption (shown by the paler lines).  
The aims is to show the possibility of increasing gross donations, without increasing the 
cost of tax relief compared to the current system. The results suggest that this would be 
possible by withdrawing the rebate and replacing it with a match in the range £0.42 to 
£0.47, depending on the proportion of higher-rate reclaimers. Alternatively, there is a 
possible policy change that maintains the current level of gross donations but with a cost 
saving (a match rate of £0.35). 
Of course, in practice, if the reform were systematic and permanent, then the long-run 
elasticities may differ from those suggested by our survey responses. Also, the 
                                                 
29 Government statistics on the value of tax relief claimed suggest that 35% higher-rate taxpayers reclaim 
and we adjust the sample proportion in line with this. See Appendix A1 for further information.  
30 We do not consider any implementation and administration costs associated with the different options, 
which may be considerable.  
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projections do not take into account potential differences in welfare effects arising from 
donors’ inconsistent responses across the two instruments. As Chetty et al. (2009) point 
out, changes in tax instruments that induce no adjustments can also generate welfare 
costs due to imperfect optimization on the part of economic agents – i.e. the welfare 
costs of the associated mistakes made.  
 
In the case of private contributions to collective goods, under the presumption that 
overall volume of collective provision is below-optimal,31 subsidies to private giving 
that are fully salient to individuals’ choices would not generate allocative distortions but 
rather they would be a second-best instrument for offsetting pre-existing allocative 
distortions. Even in the case where donors fail to respond to subsidy changes, we cannot 
conclude that lack of full optimization on the part of individuals must translate into 
lower individual welfare – in a non-cooperative contribution game, less-than-full 
optimization on the part of individuals can raise their ex-ante welfare if it supports a 
collectively more efficient outcome. Thus (abstracting from distributional effects), there 
is a presumption in this case that any policy change that raises the subsidy-inclusive 
volume of donations would be efficiency improving.  
 
Figure 2: Estimated change in gross donations and cost of tax relief 
associated with match-only options 
       
Note to figure: The central, bold line indicates the percentage changes in gross donations and the cost of 
tax relief compared to the current system based on an assumption that 35% of higher-rate taxpayers 
reclaim the rebate. The paler lines show the same, assuming that 25% and 45% reclaim.  
                                                 
31 Offering subsidies to giving can only be rationalized if collective provision is believed to be below its 
socially optimal level. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
 Basic-rate 
taxpayers 
Higher-rate 
taxpayers:  
Non-reclaimers 
Higher-rate 
taxpayers: 
Reclaimers 
Total donations – last 12 months £990 £1037 £5121 
Donations through Gift Aid – last 12 months £840 £514 £3842 
Female 0.54 0.38 0.20 
Aged < 35 0.25 0.28 0.07 
Aged 35-44 0.16 0.31 0.17 
Aged 45-54 0.18 0.26 0.34 
Aged 55-64 0.25 0.12 0.24 
Aged 65-74 0.11 0.02 0.12 
Aged 75+ 0.06 0.00 0.06 
Individual income < £30K 0.59 0.00 0.00 
Individual income £30K - £40K  0.27 0.00 0.00 
Individual income £40K - £75K 0.06 0.62 0.42 
Individual income £75K - £100K 0.00 0.13 0.14 
Individual income £100K - £200K 0.00 0.13 0.23 
Individual income > £200K 0.00 0.04 0.09 
Employed full-time 0.49 0.87 0.60 
Employed part-time 0.11 0.02 0.05 
Self-employed 0.09 0.07 0.13 
Retired 0.25 0.03 0.19 
Other non-working 0.06 0.01 0.02 
Highest qualification – degree 0.43 0.45 0.40 
Highest qualification – higher degree 0.23 0.35 0.42 
Married 0.55 0.60 0.80 
Cohabiting 0.13 0.15 0.05 
Single 0.21 0.18 0.09 
Widowed 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Divorced 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Separated 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ever had children 0.56 0.54 0.77 
Understands tax incentives 0.55 0.46 0.64 
Regular giver 0.56 0.40 0.35 
Ever worked as a volunteer 0.69 0.62 0.66 
Ever worked for a charity 0.19 0.10 0.10 
Type of charity supported    
   Medical 0.62 0.64 0.60 
   Education 0.12 0.11 0.24 
   Religious 0.33 0.17 0.46 
   Community 0.11 0.10 0.14 
   Arts 0.17 0.14 0.30 
   Sports 0.04 0.07 0.05 
   Hospices 0.50 0.48 0.48 
   Rights 0.19 0.15 0.19 
   Environment 0.21 0.17 0.26 
   Housing 0.05 0.05 0.09 
   Overseas aid 0.52 0.43 0.65 
   Welfare 0.54 0.52 0.58 
   Animals 0.22 0.18 0.17 
   Homeless 0.28 0.25 0.37 
   Disaster 0.45 0.39 0.53 
   Rescue 0.18 0.14 0.17 
Sample size 1704 633 809 
 
 
 
 27 
Sampling 
	  
Our sample would ideally be representative of the population of Gift Aid donors but this is 
unlikely because of both sampling and response bias. In practice, there is no population 
information on Gift Aid donors to allow us to investigate the extent of bias. The best benchmark 
is the Individual Giving Survey (IGS), a population-based survey that collects information on 
giving, including the use of Gift Aid. However, as shown in the figure below, the IGS is also 
likely to suffer from bias particularly in not capturing higher-value donors – the largest donation 
was £46,000 in the last year in the IGS, compared to more than 100 donors who gave more than 
£100,000 in the CAF/Justgiving sample.  
 
 
Figure A1: Distribution of total donations over the last 12 months 
 
 
 
To analyse the effect of possible policy options, we re-weight the taxpayer groups in the 
CAF/Justgiving sample to reflect estimated population shares, assuming that 80 per cent of Gift 
Aid donors are basic rate taxpayers and assuming that 35 per cent of higher-rate taxpayers 
reclaim (based on HMRC statistics). This re-weighting reduces the mean annual donation in the 
sample from £2,272 to £1,345. This is still larger than the mean annual donation in the IGS 
sample as shown in the table below. But at least some of this is explained by the larger tail in the 
CAF/Justgiving sample. Excluding donations of £50,000 or more (of which there are none in the 
IGS sample), the mean annual donation in the CAF/Justgiving sample falls to £1,137. 
 
     Mean annual donation 
 CAF/ Justgiving IGS 
Unweighted £2,273 £854 
Weighted £1,345 £854 
Weighted (excluding donations >= £50,000) £1,137 £854 
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     Figure A2: How the scenarios appeared to respondents 
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Appendix 3 
   
   P-values: test for significant differences across scenarios –   H0:   βs  = βz ,  s ≠ z 
  
Higher-rate taxpayers 
Dependent variable = ln (gross donations) 
 M25R30 M20R25 M25R20 M50R0 M30R0 M30R0 M37R0 M66R0 M50R0 
M30R25 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
M25R30  .000 .000 .000 .000 .020 .449 .000 .000 
M20R25   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
M25R20    .000 .000 .096 .001 .000 .000 
M50R0     .000 .000 .000 .000 .842 
M30R0      .124 .000 .000 .000 
M30R0       .000 .000 .000 
M37R0        .000 .000 
M66R0         .000 
Dependent variable = ln (nominal donations) 
 M25R30 M20R25 M25R20 M50R0 M30R0 M30R0 M37R0 M66R0 M50R0 
M30R25 .000 .219 .273 .026 .000 .000 .007 .024 .017 
M25R30  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
M20R25   .850 .317 .000 .008 .139 .297 .234 
M25R20    .257 .000 .005 .107 .240 .187 
M50R0     .000 .102 .632 .958 .842 
M30R0      .124 .007 .002 .003 
M30R0       .103 .118 .156 
M37R0        .674 .783 
M66R0         .838 
 
Basic-rate taxpayers 
Dependent variable = ln (gross donations) 
 M37R0 M37R0 M30R0 
M30R0 .000 .000 .812 
M37R0  .115 .000 
M37R0   .000 
Dependent variable = ln (nominal donations) 
 M37R0 M37R0 M30R0 
M30R0 .000 .000 .812 
M37R0  .115 .009 
M37R0   .000 
  
